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BOOK REVIEW
PROCESSES OF CONSTITUTIONAL DECISIONMAKING: CASES AND
MATERIALS. By Paul Brest. Boston: Little, Brown & Co. 1975.
Pp. xlv, 1377. $22.50.
Reviewed by Henry P. Monaghan2
Authors of constitutional law casebooks traditionally have
presented their subject through Supreme Court opinions arranged
under the three general groupings of judicial review, distribution
of powers (federalism and separation of powers), and individual
liberties.' This organizational consensus rests upon two widely
held and deep beliefs: a basic course in constitutional law should
(i) consist of a rigorous and sustained study of substantive doc-
trine and (2) be undertaken principally through a detailed exam-
ination of Supreme Court decisions, albeit supplemented in vary-
ing degrees by authors' questions and law review excerpts.4
Paul Brest's Processes of Constitutional Decisionmaking
poses a formidable challenge to this standing wisdom. The book
is divided into two parts. Part I concentrates on the process by
which constitutional principles are derived by any decisionmaker,
whether that person be judge, legislator, or executive official, and
Part II addresses the special role of the judiciary in constitutional
exegesis. In place of substantive doctrinal exposition, Professor
Brest's focus is on questions of process and methodology which
cut across the standard substantive topics. Indeed, six of his
fifteen chapters are entirely process-oriented; while the remaining
nine chapters center on substantive doctrinal exposition within
the traditional three groupings, even here the emphasis is upon
methodology.
The end result is an important and exciting contribution.
Constitutional Decisionmaking is certainly an appropriate vehicle
for an advanced course in constitutional law. While I can readily
understand a desire to use it in that context, I concur with Pro-
fessor Brest's fundamental belief that questions of process and
'Professor of Law, Stanford University.
2 Professor of Law, Boston University.
'There has been occasional effort at a historical development. See I P.
FREUND, A. SUTHERLAND, M. HOWE & E. BROWN, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: CASES
AND OTHER PROBLEMS 3-42 (3d ed. 1967). More recently, there has been some
move to omit or postpone to the end of the course detailed examination of
materials on judicial review. See G. GUNTHER, CASES AND MATRaALS ON CONSTrTrU-
TIONAL LAW 1532--652 (9th ed. 1975).
4 Professor Gunther, while following the traditional format, has directed
special attention to the constraints inherent in the institution of judicial review.
See G. GUNTHER, supra note 3.
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methodology are crucial intellectual questions which should be
given far more emphasis in a first course in constitutional law.5
For the answers posed, explicitly or (as is more often the case)
implicitly, to these insistent questions shape the boundaries of
substantive doctrinal developments.'
While Constitutional Decisionmaking's major innovation lies
in its focus on the process of decisionmaking,7 its attention to the
interaction of various decisionmakers and to the institutional
constraints on judicial process also represents an important ad-
vance over previous casebooks. While showing in Part I that
troublesome methodological problems exist regardless of the
identity of the constitutional decisionmaker, Professor Brest
repeatedly (pp. 87-101) emphasizes that the judicial perspective
on constitutional questions is often a limited one. Far more
frequently than realized, judicial rejection of challenges to speci-
fic conduct is not so much a positive declaration of constitution-
ality as it is a declaration that, given the institutional constraints
limiting the judicial process, the challenged conduct cannot be
adjudicated improper.! Part II of Constitutional Decisionmaking
'I recognize that a skillful teacher will deal to some degree with the problems
of language, purpose, and history as well as other "process" questions in the con-
text of the traditional subject matter categories, but I think it more satisfactory to
have some materials in front of the student, explicitly doing so in a sustained man-
ner. Moreover, a first-year course in constitutional law provides the student with
a discrete and highly visible context for consideration of "legal process" questions,
and this should generate a beneficial spillover for other courses.
' I, of course, put to one side as unacceptable the view that a court is merely
a power organ and that, consequently, the study of its processes and methodology
has little merit. See Monaghan, Constitutional Adjudication: The Who and
When, 82 YALE L.J. 1363, 1363 n.3 (i973).
" The process questions considered by Professor Brest include the appropriate
role of language, purpose, history, changed circumstances, structure and relation-
ship, and extraconstitutional values in the formulation of constitutional prin-
ciples. This inquiry is pursued in introductory materials on constitutional in-
terpretation (pp. X-17), and in subsequent chapters on the traditional subjects of
federalism, separation of powers, and the fourteenth amendment (pp. 172-889).
In addition, there is a chapter on "constitutional facts" (pp. 854-953) exploring the
relevance and judicial ascertainment of facts in the context of the death penalty
and race discrimination cases.
Since many of the issues listed above enter into the interpretation of any
written document and concern the entire legal order, it is not surprising that much
of the material initially considered is not concerned with constitutional law at all -
for example, extracts from Wasserstrom's The Judicial Decision and from the ex-
change between Professors H.L.A. Hart and Lon Fuller over the relationship be-
tween language and purpose in statutory construction (pp. 3-5, 36-40).
'The intractable problem of racially rooted exclusionary zoning provides a
recent illustration of the phenomenon. See Village of Arlington Heights v. Metro-
politan Hous. Dev. Corp., 97 S. Ct. 555 (i977). Mr. Justice Powell's opinion ap-
parently assumes, compare id. with Palmer v. Thompson, 403 US. 217 (I971),
that if proven, an impermissible racial motive would justify voiding a facially
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explores in detail the sources of these constitutional constraints
and the ways in which courts operate within them. It deals with
a wide range of problems, from the justifications for judicial re-
view, the requirement of principled decisionmaking, modes of
judicial review, judicial inquiry into the motives of other decision-
makers, and stare decisis, to the "case or controversy" require-
ment and its allied limitations.
Professor Brest also departs from tradition by relying heavily
on source material other than Supreme Court decisions. For ex-
ample, the book contains extracts from Senate hearings on the
confirmation of a former attorney general (pp. 15-3i), the de-
bates of the framers of the fourteenth amendment (pp. 463-72),
and the controversy between Hamilton and Madison on the nature
of Presidential authority (pp. 41i-i6). Efforts are made through
notes and copious law review extracts to acquaint the students
with the wider intellectual and social context in which constitu-
tional principles ariseY Most importantly, Professor Brest's
thinking is very much in evidence throughout the book. He pro-
vides essays (often structured around law review excerpts) in
which he suggests relevant inquiries and appropriate modes for
analysis.' 0 At times, the essays seem to overshadow the opinions
of the Court; they, and not the opinions, seem to be primary
material for class consideration. I do not make this remark dis-
paragingly. For the essays are of the highest quality - lucid,
stimulating, and illuminating."
neutral and fairly applied zoning ordinance. On that unexamined substantive
premise he deals at some length with the difficult question of ascertaining motive.
Although his opinion goes as far as possible in allowing proof of discriminatory
motive, 97 S. Ct. at 564-65, it is readily apparent that courts will have great
difficulty in determining the motives of multimember bodies. This difficulty is, in
fact, insurmountable if, as the opinion suggests, local officials might have some
general privilege not to testify. Id. at 565. See ginerally Note, Reading the Mind
of the School Board: Segregative Intent and the De Facto/De Jure Distinction, 86
YALE L.J. 317 (1976).
'For example, prior to the excerpt of Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45
(igo5), there is an extensive note which introduces (or reintroduces, as the case
may be) students not only to the influential proponents of Social Darwinism, but
also to the organized bar's espousal of that and other doctrines of limited govern-
ment.
"OFor example, Professor Brest provides essays on the validity of racially
dependent classifications (pp. 480-89, 543-49), on the meaning of the minimum
rationality test (pp. 557-66, 572-75), and on the requirement of principled decision-
making (pp. io99-1I8).
" Professor Brest's views are not beyond challenge, as he would be the first
to acknowledge. He is apparently far more comfortable than I am with a spacious
concept of judicial lawmaking under the general language of the fourteenth amend-
ment. He seems to assume that this is permissible because the framers of that
amendment did not expressly restrict the Court (e.g., pp. 475 (question (d)), 557,
576, 733-34). As an original matter, I would have thought that the question was
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While I subscribe to Professor Brest's fundamental approach
and have considerable admiration for the teaching tool he has pro-
duced, I do have difficulty with the degree to which he has de-
parted from the traditional view that a constitutional law course
should focus primarily on case materials. Constitutional Decision-
making has far fewer cases than its counterparts. 2 This is the
result of omission of doctrinal subjects and reduction in the
case material in the areas covered. The cases which are repro-
duced are frequently heavily edited. Even more importantly,
the cases summarized in the notes are, in my judgment, often so
truncated that they are pedagogically sterilized.
Since the reduction reflects Professor Brest's desire for an
introductory teaching casebook, not a quasi-treatise, the reduc-
tion standing alone is not objectionable. However, the sparsity of
court opinions poses problems transcending a first-year teacher's
concern with the development of case-reading skills. Indeed, it
detracts from the book's ability to explore the process issues,
since the working of the legal process through case decisions is
insufficiently illustrated. With the exception of the perhaps over-
emphasized racial equal protection cases,' 3 this combination of
fewer cases and heavy editing also presents real difficulties for
anyone interested in sustained doctrinal analysis, the traditional
staple of constitutional law courses. The impact of the editing
process becomes immediately apparent in the federalism ma-
terials; "4 however, my general point is not confined to any
whether the framers had authorized (not restricted) that activity. Any assertion,
therefore, that the due process and equal protection clauses are "avowedly de-
velopmental" (p. 1125), while it may be descriptively accurate, is normatively
doubtful. It was, after all, the organized bar and the courts, not the framers of
the fourteenth amendment, who loosened the equal protection clause from its
moorings in racial discrimination. More importantly, it was they who wholly
transformed the meaning of "liberty" and "process" in the due process clause.
See Monaghan, O "Liberty" and "Property," 62 CORNELL L.J. 405 (X977).
These developments are far too ingrained in the political-constitutional order to
admit of any major reassessment, Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976), criticized
in Monaghan, supra, to the contrary notwithstanding. The remaining, but import-
ant, question is the extent to which the constitutional protection of "liberty" au-
thorizes special judicial protection for extraconstitutional values, those not readily
inferable from the constitutional text, structure, or history.
12 Based on the table of cases and my use of the book, I estimate that the
shortfall is about 50%.
13 Even here, I wish that some explicit attention had been given to the "white
flight-tipping point" problem.
14 Federal power to spend and to tax for regulatory purposes is gone over
hurriedly, and at the cost of an opportunity to focus on the limits of the judicial
process. The case material on the negative impact of the commerce clause on
state regulation is extremely truncated-South Carolina State Highway Dep't v.
Barnwell Bros., Inc., 303 U.S. 177 (1938), is stated in slightly over a single
page-and consideration of state taxation of interstate commerce is entirely eli..i-
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particular area -virtually wherever one turns, doctrinal exposi-
tion is at least difficult. Professor Brest's heavy editing repre-
sents, I think, an overreaction to prior casebooks' nearly exclu-
sive reliance on substantive doctrinal exposition.
Beyond the heavy editing, there are other difficulties. Some
(not including me) will regret the omission of any materials on
the first amendment. Other omissions raise questions concern-
ing the proper relationship between a first course in constitutional
law and other more specialized courses with constitutional law
dimensions - for example, administrative law, family law, the
law of the federal courts, taxation, and property. Professor
Brest's treatment of three traditional topics of a constitutional
law course highlights this difficulty.
First, Constitutional Decisionmaking does not permit a close
look at the protection afforded by the Constitution to private
property. The economic substantive due process materials are
adequate. But treatment of the contracts clause is not. Home
Building & Loan Association v. Blaisdel 11 is taken up as a main
case in a "process" chapter (p. 146) and is followed by a brief
"before and after" developments note which treats the case in a
cursory fashion. For example, the core of the City of El Paso v.
Simmons 16 holding that the contract clause protects only prom-
ises central to the agreement" 7 is not stated at all (p. 157).
Except for a brief note, the related materials on the "taking"
clause are eliminated on the premise that they are better consid-
ered in land use courses (pp. 739-40). I disagree. Examination
of these materials in the context of the general "due process
field theory" gives a student perspective on the fifth amendment
and a feeling for the limited utility of its taking component as a
principled device with which courts can protect private property
from the reach of regulatory power.
Second, Constitutional Decisionmaking's emphasis on deci-
inated. For teachers anxious to get past the federalism material all this will be a
plus. But it is not for me.
My own practice had been to consider the negative impact materials after a con-
sideration of the fourteenth amendment's minimum rationality restraints, thus
emphasizing the possible differences between the two forms of attack in terms of
both the substantive criteria employed and the resulting nature of the evidentiary
problems presented. While the material lacked the glamour of the race cases, it
was, I thought, "lawyers' law," an area where students do not start with strong
preconceptions and where they could be led to examine the problems in a dis-
ciplined manner with (hopefully) a developing recognition of the institutional re-
straints limiting the courts.
I5 290 U.S. 398 (1934). See also United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 45
U.S.L.W. 44x8 (U.S. April 12, 1977).
16379 U.S. 497 (I965).
17 See id. at 514-15.
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sionmakers other than courts coupled with the heavy editing of
cases reveals a limitation more evident here than in most case-
books: a failure to reconcile the traditional subject matter of a
constitutional law course with the growing statutory protection
of civil rights. 8 The proliferation of recent federal civil rights
legislation, coupled with the Supreme Court's expansive con-
struction of the opaque Reconstruction acts, has meant that the
subject of constitutional law may become increasingly divorced
from that of civil rights. For the practicing lawyer, civil rights
legislation, with all of its intricacies, and not the Constitution,
has become the focus of attention. However, a constitutional law
course still has a role in alerting students to the complexity and
importance of civil rights legislation.
Third, while the chapter on separation of powers has much
of interest, it too might be said to suffer from a tendency to
defer certain issues for consideration in more specialized courses.
This chapter has what are, to my mind, failings common to all
casebooks in this area, both in terms of what is included and
what is not. For example, I do not see the justification for ex-
tensive consideration of the marginally important impeachment
device (pp. 358-70). On the other hand, while perhaps alone
in my view, I think that constitutional law casebooks should
consider in detail the quite basic question of Presidential power
to control the administration of law. Professor Brest, following
the general approach, presents the crucial cases in truncated
form (pp. 368-70), and eliminates entirely the "standing" aspect
of United States v. Nixon "9 (p. 382). I would also include far
more on the delegation problems than customarily appears in a
first book (pp. 356-58). That material is centrally important to
an adequate understanding of the role of Congress in the con-
stitutional order; moreover, it is important to consider the con-
text of the Steel Seizure Case 20 (p. 393). I recognize that
Presidential control and delegation problems are considered in
administrative law casebooks. But I suspect that they are not
emphasized there. In any event, I think they are at the core
of any introduction to the doctrine of separation of powers.
18 For example, the complex holding in Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88
(i97i), is summarized in ten lines (p. 674). The footnote asserting (p. 676 n.37)
that Griffin overruled Collins v. Hardyman, 341 U.S. 65i (1951), is at best mis-
leading. Collins did not involve racial discrimination or the right to travel. Ac-
cordingly, to overrule its specific holding and apply 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) (i97o) to
private interference with freedom of speech would require an explicit overruling of
The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883). Compare the treatment of these sta-
tutes in G. GUNTHER, supra note 3, at 898-io39.
1o 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
20 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
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Finally, I think material on the increasingly important "legislative
veto" is needed.2
There are, in sum, costs 22 as well as advantages to the use of
this casebook. For some those costs will be more weighty than
for others. For myself the book represents an impressive work
despite any flaws. Further, some of the defects are unnecessary
and could be easily ameliorated in a subsequent edition. The
crucial point remains that Constitutional Decisionmaking is an
admirable, important, and exciting work which will, I believe,
materially affect the format of future constitutional law case-
books and the way in which the subject is taught.
21 See Clark v. Valeo, 45 U.S.L.W. 2349 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 2i, 1977), appeal doc-
keted, 45 U.S.L.W. 3544 (U.S. Feb. 9, 1977) (No. 76-105).
22Nothing would be gained by attempting to catalogue more minor difficul-
ties, which are often highly subjective. I would simply say that, from my perspec-
tive, some of the notes work well, some not so well. For example, the attempt to
take up the "incorporation" debate by a law review extract and a note (pp. 693-
704) seems to me not successful. Reproduction of Palko v. Connecticut, 302
U.S. 319 (1973), should have preceded these materials. On other occasions the
detail of some of the notes seems to distract from the point being made.
[Vol. go1368
